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BAD FAITH IN FIRST PARTY INSURANCE
CONTRACTS-WHAT'S NEXT?
Paula J. Casey*
I. INTRODUCTION
Arkansas recently joined other jurisdictions in recognizing that an
insurer which engages in practices in bad faith to avoid paying legiti-
mate policy claims to its insured not only breaches a contract but also
commits the tort of first party bad faith.' Damages for breach of con-
tract are generally limited to those which were forseeable or contem-
plated by the parties at the time the contract was made2 while compen-
satory and punitive damages may be recovered in a tort action.8
Therefore, the recognition of the tort of first party bad faith broadens
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law.
I. Employers Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 282 Ark. 29, 665 S.W.2d 873 (1984);
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 281 Ark. 128, 664 S.W.2d 463 (1983).
For a discussion of the cases see Note, Tort Of Bad Faith In First Party Actions Recognized, 7
UALR L.J. 671 (1984).
2. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854); Chicago, R.I. and P.R. Co.
v. King, 104 Ark. 215, 148 S.W. 1035 (1912).
3. Compensatory damages are awarded for the purpose of making the injured party whole.
Dunaway v. Troutt, 232 Ark. 615, 339 S.W.2d 613 (1960). Negligence will not support an award
of punitive damages; the tortfeasor's conduct must be willful or malicious. Freeman v. Anderson,
279 Ark. 282, 651 S.W.2d 450 (1983). Punitive damages are not generally recoverable in a con-
tract action, L.L. Cole & Son, Inc. v. Hickman, 282 Ark. 6, 665 S.W.2d 278 (1984); Snow v.
Grace, 25 Ark. 570 (1869), although some jurisdictions allow punitive damages in breach of con-
tract cases. See J. MCCARTHY, PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN BAD FAITH CAsES § 8 (3d ed. 1983) for a
collection of cases awarding punitive damages in contract actions.
237
UALR LAW JOURNAL
the range of damages which may be recovered by the insured in an
action against the insurer for payment of policy benefits."
This article will trace the expansion of the tort of third party bad
faith in Arkansas to the recent recognition of first party bad faith. The
proof necessary to establish the tort in Arkansas will be examined as
well as the types of damages which may be imposed against an insurer.
Finally, the article will discuss the possible application of the tort of
bad faith to other contract actions in Arkansas.
II. THE BEGINNING OF BAD FAITH
Liability insurance policies typically provide that the insurer will
control all aspects of litigation including settlement of lawsuits.' An
insured who fails or refuses to allow his insurer to control litigation
breaches the insurance contract and relieves the insurer of liability
under the terms of the policy.' The insurer in control of litigation often
is faced with a conflict of interest in making decisions about settlement.
For example, when an insured has been sued for an amount greatly in
excess of the policy limits and any offer to settle would require the
insurer to pay the policy limits, the insurer actually gambles nothing if
it chooses to pursue litigation to its conclusion rather than settle the
case for the policy limit. The insured, on the other hand, is not only in
the position of having a large judgment taken against him, but is also
in the position of having someone else make the decisions about
whether a settlement offer should be accepted. An insurer which negli-
gently or in bad faith fails or refuses to settle a case, thus exposing its
insured to a judgment in excess of the policy limits, commits the tort of
third party bad faith.
Several decades prior to the recognition and development of third
party bad faith as a tort,' the Arkansas Supreme Court recognized that
4. For a discussion of the damages recovered by the plaintiffs in Broadway Arms and Wil-
liams, see infra notes 60-109 and accompanying text.
5. R. KEETON. INSURANCE LAW § 7.8 (3d ed. 1973).
6. Gunter v. La Grone, 253 Ark. 644, 488 S.W.2d 18 (1972).
7. The California court held in 1958 that a wrongful refusal to settle gave rise to a cause of
action in either contract or in tort. Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328
P.2d 198 (1958). An insured was allowed to recover damages for mental suffering which resulted
from an insurer's failure to settle a case. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173,
58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967). The tort theories of recovery in third party cases were important to the
later development of bad faith law in first party cases. Damages for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress were recovered by an insured when his insurer failed to pay benefits under a disabil-
ity policy. Fletcher v. Western Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970). In
Fletcher, the court discussed an implied duty of fair dealing in insurance contracts. Breach of the
implied duty of fair dealing blossomed into a first party bad faith tort in the landmark case of
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an insurer should not be allowed to exploit its control of litigation to
the detriment of the insured. In Southern Surety Co. v. Puryear-Meyer
Grocery Co.,' the insurer posed a defense in a lawsuit against its in-
sured which protected the insurer against liability but left the insured
exposed.9 The insured settled the case and sued the insurer for indem-
nification. In affirming the judgment against the insurer, the court
found that the insurance company had a duty to defend against the
claim of the third party and could not control the litigation with the
sole purpose of absolving itself from liability to its insured. 10
In 1954, the Arkansas Supreme Court again recognized that an
insurer must deal fairly with its insured in Home Indemnity Co. v.
Snowden." The insurer claimed that Mr. Snowden, the insured, was
not liable in a wrongful death action that had been filed against him
and if he were liable there was no coverage under the policy.12 Mr.
Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973). See
Comment, An Independent Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Insurance Con-
tracts-Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co., II SAN DIEGo L. Rv. 492 (1975) for a discussion of
the development of California law.
8. 151 Ark. 480, 236 S.W. 841 (1922).
9. The insured was sued by a third party as a result of an automobile accident. A default
judgment was taken but was abandoned by the third party after the insured claimed a lack of
notice in the lawsuit. A second suit was then instituted and process was served on the insured. The
insured immediately notified the insurer of the second lawsuit. The insurance company took con-
trol of the litigation. After a second judgment was rendered against the insured in the court of
common pleas, the insured appealed the case to circuit court. On appeal to circuit court, the
insurer claimed that the second judgment from the court of common pleas was invalid because the
first judgment made the case res judicata. The circuit court ruled that the second judgment was
res judicata and the first judgment was established as valid. Because the insured had not notified
the insurer of the institution of the first lawsuit, the insurer then claimed that it was not liable
under the terms of the policy which provided that:
(a) Upon the occurrence of an accident covered by this policy, the assured shall give
immediate written notice thereof with the fullest information obtainable at the time to
the company, or its duly authorized agent. If a claim is made on account of such acci-
dent, the assured shall give like notice thereof, with full particulars. If suit is brought to
enforce such claim, the assured shall immediately forward to the company every sum-
mons, or other process, as soon as same shall have been served upon him. The assured
shall at all times render to the company all co-operation and assistance, except in a
pecuniary way, within his power.
(b) The assured * * * shall not interfere in any negotiations for settlement, or in any
legal proceeding conducted by the company on account of any claim ...
Id. at 483, 236 S.W. at 844.
10. Id. at 484, 236 S.W. at 845.
11. 223 Ark. 64, 264 S.W.2d 642 (1954).
12. Mr. Snowden owned and operated a number of frozen food locker plants. He hired a
refrigeration contractor to make repairs to one of the plants. The contractor died of gas poisoning
while trying to repair the refrigerators and his widow filed a wrongful death action against Mr.
Snowden. Home Indemnity Company, the public liability insurance carrier for Mr. Snowden, ad-
vised him that they would protect "our mutual interest" but also advised him that he could em-
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Snowden settled the case after the insurer refused to contribute the
policy proceeds to the settlement, and he then filed suit against the
insurer. Mr. Snowden received a verdict in the trial court for the full
amount which he had expended in settlement of the case. 3 On appeal,
the Arkansas Supreme Court found that when an insurer assumes the
responsibility of litigation on behalf of an insured, it owes the insured a
duty of good faith. The court used language which indicated that the
cause of action was in contract and that an insurer breaches the insur-
ance contract by arbitrarily refusing to settle. 4 The court applied a
contract measure of damages in Snowden and reduced the judgment to
the policy limit. 15 If the court had determined that the cause of action
was in tort, Mr. Snowden could have recovered damages in excess of
the policy limit.
It was not until several years later, in Southern Farm Bureau Cas-
ualty Insurance Co. v. Parker,6 that the court moved from a contract
to a tort analysis of third party bad faith. In Parker, the court ex-
tended an insurer's liability for failure to settle third party claims from
the bad faith standard which was set out in Snowden to a standard of
mere negligence. The court reasoned in Parker that a failure to settle
could be a negligent act even though the insurer was acting in good
faith.17 The court's holding that the insurer's liability could be based on
negligence was a clear indication that the cause of action was based in
tort although the court never addressed the question. Any doubt that
might have remained about whether the cause of action was in contract
or in tort was dispelled the next year in Southern Farm Bureau Casu-
alty Co. v. Hardin.'8 In Hardin, the court reversed a decision awarding
pre-judgment interest against an insurer, holding that the action was
one in tort.' 9
The determination of whether the action is in tort or in contract is
significant because of the difference in the types of damages which are
recoverable. Under traditional contract theory, a party's expectation in-
ploy an attorney at his own expense if he so desired. The insurance company took the position
during the conference that if the refrigeration contractor could be shown to be an employee of Mr.
Snowden rather than an independent contractor, the insurance company would not be liable under
its policy. Id.
13. Mr. Snowden settled the case for $8,467.77 but the face value of the insurance policy
was only $5,000. Id. at 69-71, 264 S.W.2d at 645.
14. Id. at 70, 264 S.W.2d at 645.
15. Id. at 71, 264 S.W.2d at 646.
16. 232 Ark. 841, 341 S.W.2d 36 (1960).
17. Id. at 848, 341 S.W.2d at 41.
18. 233 Ark. 1011, 351 S.W.2d 153 (1961).
19. Id. at 1014, 351 S.W.2d at 155.
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FIRST PARTY BAD FAITH
terest is protected by awarding him the benefit of the bargain in the
event the other party breaches.2" In the context of liability insurance, if
an insurer fulfills its contract, the policy limit is the maximum extent of
its liability. 21 Following this theory, an insured who faces a judgment in
excess of his policy limits after his insurer fails to settle a case can only
expect the insurer to pay the face amount of the policy.2 2 However, by
using a tort theory of damages, the court can award damages beyond
those which would be allowable in contract actions. The injured party
in a tort action is generally entitled to compensation for all injuries
caused by the defendant.23 In addition, if the defendant's conduct is
sufficiently malicious, punitive damages may be awarded. 24
It is well settled in Arkansas that an insurer may be liable for
extracontractual damages if the insurer fraudulently, negligently, or in
bad faith fails or refuses to settle a case within the policy limits. 25 This
rule of law provided the basis for the recognition of first party torts of
bad faith in Arkansas.
III. EXTENSION OF BAD FAITH TO FIRST PARTY
CONTRACTS
The idea that an insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith
when dealing with its insured in a third party situation or risk liability
beyond the face amount of the policy was gradually extended to in-
clude dealings which were between just the insured and insurer. While
early cases were either based on contract,26 or found their roots in al-
ready established torts27 (such as intentional infliction of severe mental
distress), the cause of action for bad faith in insurance contracts
evolved into a full-fledged tort in its own right. By the time the Arkan-
sas courts were faced with the question of first party bad faith the issue
20. Rebsamen Companies, Inc. v. Ark. State Hospital Employees Federal Credit Union, 258
Ark. 160, 522 S.W.2d 845 (1975).
21. But see Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 118 N.H. 607, 392 A.2d 576 (1978),
where the court held that the insured's extracontractual damages were a foreseeable result of the
insurer's breach.
22. See Home Indem. Co. v. Snowden, 233 Ark. 64, 264 S.W.2d 642 (1954), where the court
applied a contract measure of damages for the insurer's breach.
23. See, e.g., St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Brummett, 201 Ark. 53, 143 S.W.2d 555
(1940).
24. See, e.g., Barlow v. Lowder, 35 Ark. 492 (1880).
25. See, e.g., Tri-State Ins. Co. v. Busby, 251 Ark. 568, 473 S.W.2d 893 (1971).
26. See supra note 21.
27. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78
(1970).
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had been settled in a number of jurisdictions. 8
The question was raised initially in Arkansas in Findley v. Time
Insurance Co.29 In that case, the insured had purchased a major medi-
cal policy from the insurer and later filed claims against the policy. The
insurer refused to pay the claims alleging that the insured had failed to
disclose prior existing conditions which, if disclosed, would have re-
sulted in the insurer not issuing the policy. The insured sued, alleging
causes of action in both contract and tort. The supreme court affirmed
the trial court's dismissal, holding that the complaint did not state a
cause of action in tort for bad faith. The first party tort of bad faith
was described in Findley as a logical extension of third party bad
faith.30 The court then approved the traditional method of distinguish-
ing the type of conduct which will amount to a tort based on breach of
contract. In order for an insurer to be liable for bad faith based on
breach of a first party insurance contract in Arkansas, the insurer
would have to engage in affirmative conduct. In other words, the in-
surer would have to do more than simply refuse to pay, which could be
described as nonfeasance. The insurer would have to be "actively en-
gaged in dishonest, malicious, or oppressive conduct in order to avoid
its liability."3 1 However, in the best judicial tradition, the court stopped
short of actually recognizing bad faith as a tort in Arkansas because of
its finding that the facts alleged in Findley failed to state a cause of
action.
Almost five years after Findley3 2 the court was forced to answer
28. See, e.g., Sparks v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 132 Ariz. 529, 647 P.2d 1127 (1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1070 (1982); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032,
108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
29. 264 Ark. 647, 573 S.W.2d 908 (1978).
30. Id. at 649, 573 S.W.2d at 909. The court, after stating that the tort of first party bad
faith was a logical extension of the third party bad faith tort, set out a hypothetical to illustrate
the problems in third party cases. Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376,
89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970), was cited as "the landmark decision extending the doctrine of the failure
to settle cases .. " The court never addressed the similarities or differences of first and third
party cases nor did the court explain the logic of the extension.
31. 264 Ark. at 654-55, 573 S.W.2d at 911-12.
32. In the interim between Findley and Broadway Arms the court recognized that the con-
tractual relationship between the insurer and the insured did not protect the insurer from liability
for tortious conduct. In 1978, the Arkansas Court of Appeals determined that a cause of action in
deceit would lie against an insurance company. In Sturgeon v. American Family Life Assurance
Co., 266 Ark. 1040, 589 S.W.2d 207 (1979), the insurer sold a cancer insurance policy to Mr.
Sturgeon and represented that the policy would pay benefits in addition to any other benefits Mr.
Sturgeon might have. The company later refused to pay the claims which resulted from Mr. Stur-
geon having cancer of the larynx. The trial court made a pre-trial ruling that the complaint stated
a cause of action in contract and refused to allow discovery of information regarding punitive
damages. In reversing the trial court's decision that the complaint was in contract and not in tort,
[Vol. 8:237
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the question of whether Arkansas would recognize the tort of bad faith
in first party insurance contracts in the case of Aetna Casualty and
Surety Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp." Broadway Arms Corporation
was insured against fire loss by Aetna Casualty and Surety Company.
A fire at Broadway Arms Corporation destroyed or damaged all inven-
tory and resulted in the business being closed. Several days after the
fire Aetna paid Broadway Arms $30,000 as a partial payment on the
loss. Attempts to negotiate a settlement on the remainder of the claim
failed and eventually Broadway Arms Corporation filed suit against
Aetna claiming damages based on the tort of bad faith. The jury found
that Aetna had acted in bad faith and awarded $175,000 compensatory
damages and $5,000,000 in punitive damages to Broadway Arms
Corporation.
Broadway Arms Corporation made three allegations of bad faith
against Aetna. The first was that Aetna had refused to pay policy lim-
its under the fire coverage. It was also alleged that Aetna had failed to
release the salvage of the fire to Broadway Arms Corporation. The final
allegation was that an agent of Aetna had threatened to report Broad-
way Arms Corporation to the Internal Revenue Service.-4 The jury
found that Broadway Arms was entitled to more money under the pol-
icy provisions than was offered by Aetna during negotiations. In addi-
the court of appeals held that the complaint contained all of the elements of the tort of deceit.
The Arkansas Supreme Court approved the court of appeals ruling in Sturgeon in deciding the
case of M.F.A. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Keller, 274 Ark. 281, 623 S.W.2d 841 (1981). However, the
Keller decision demonstrates the difficulty of applying the cause of action in deceit to some insur-
ance cases. In Keller, the insured's proof of loss claim for $44,000 for fire loss on a house was
refused by the insurer. The insurer offered $22,750 to the insured to settle the claim. The insured
filed suit, which resulted in a judgment for the claim on the policy, a penalty and attorney's fees,
compensatory and punitive damages. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the award for com-
pensatory and punitive damages, which were based on the tort of deceit. The court noted that the
cause of action for deceit requires that a defendant knowingly make a false representation with
the intention to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting in reliance on the misrepresenta-
tion. In addition, the plaintiff must justifiably rely upon the defendant's representation with result-
ing damages. The court then found that there was substantial evidence to support a finding that
the insurance company had made false representations of fact to its insured in denying that the
insurer's appraiser had estimated the cost of repair to the house at $40,000 to $50,000 and in
alleging that local contractors refused to bid on the house. The court also found that there was
substantial evidence to find that the representations were made knowingly by the insurance com-
pany with the intention of inducing the insured to accept the $22,750 offer of settlement which
had been made. However, the insured had not accepted the insurer's offer of settlement, appar-
ently because the insured knew that the offer was too low. Therefore, the insured had not acted in
reliance on the insurer's representations and had suffered no damage as a result. The court re-
versed the judgment for compensatory and punitive damages.
33. 281 Ark. 128, 664 S.W.2d 463 (1983).
34. Id. at 134, 664 S.W.2d at 466.
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tion, the jury found that Aetna had committed acts of bad faith. On
appeal, the court found that the salvage from the fire had remained in
the control of Broadway Arms Corporation at all times. The court held
that, as a matter of law, there was nothing about the handling of the
salvage claim which was dishonest, malicious, or oppressive. Because
the case was remanded,35 the court did not make a finding about the
alleged threat involving the Internal Revenue Service. Although the
Broadway Arms case was reversed and remanded for a new trial, any
doubts which may have remained after Findley were eliminated; Ar-
kansas clearly recognizes that bad faith is an actionable tort in the
context of first party insurance contracts.3 1
Within a matter of weeks, the court had the opportunity to further
elaborate on the tort of bad faith in Employers Equitable Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Williams.37 Mr. Williams had purchased a health and acci-
dent policy from Employers Equitable on July 1, 1980. The policy was
for a one month term, was renewable monthly, and had a thirty-one
day grace period. The policy also provided that acceptance of a late
premium payment without a request for reapplication would automati-
cally result in the policy being reinstated. However, Employers Equita-
ble could issue a conditional receipt and require the insured to reapply.
If the reapplication was not rejected within forty-five days, the policy
would be automatically reinstated.
Mr. Williams had a heart attack on November 1, 1981. In Decem-
ber, he filed a claim for benefits. Mr. Williams made repeated inquiries
about the status of his claim and was told that it was being processed.
On March 22, 1982, Mr. Williams received his benefit check and a
notice that because of late payments of premiums he would have to
submit a reapplication for insurance. His reapplication was denied by
Employers Equitable on May 7, 1982.
In the meantime, the Arkansas Insurance Department began an
investigation of Employers Equitable. As a result of the investigation,
35. The case was reversed and remanded because the court found that a jury instruction
based on a section of the Trade Practices Act, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3005(9) (1980) was im-
proper. The statute defines conduct which constitutes "Unfair Claims Settlement Practices" under
the Act. However, the portion of the statute which reads, "committing or performing with such
frequency as to indicate a general business practice, any of the following," was omitted from the
instruction. The court also found that violation of the Trade Practices Act is not necessarily evi-
dence of bad faith. See Glasgow, First Party Bad Faith Comes to Arkansas, 18 ARKANSAS LAW-
YER 48 (1984), for the attorney's view of the case and the trial.
36. The Broadway Arms case was settled during the second trial for an undisclosed amount
of money. Arkansas Gazette, July 21, 1984, at 13A, col. 5.
37. 282 Ark. 29, 665 S.W.2d 873 (1984).
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Employers Equitable was issued the largest fine ever levied under the
insurance penalty statute in the history of the state. In addition, its
license to operate was suspended twice.
Employers Equitable claimed that Mr. Williams' policy was can-
celled because his February payment was not made until March 15th.
The court found that although the insurance company's worksheets,
which were entered by hand, reflected that Mr. Williams had made no
premium payments in February and March, the company's computer
cards showed that the February payment and the March payment were
both timely made. In addition, there was evidence that the computer
cards had been altered. The jury found that the insurance company
had acted in bad faith by declaring that the policy had lapsed. On ap-
peal, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the decision and held that
there was substantial evidence that the insurance company had acted in
bad faith. The court further held that there was sufficient evidence to
support the award of $25,000 in compensatory damages and $75,000 in
punitive damages as well as a statutory penalty and attorney's fees.
The Broadway Arms and Williams decisions place Arkansas in
the ever growing number of jurisdictions which have recognized the
tort of bad faith in first party insurance contracts. Findley and Broad-
way Arms both refer to the new tort as a logical extension of the third
party bad faith tort. However, comparison of the standard of conduct
applied to insurers, the recoverable damages, and the insurer/insured
relationship in the two situations provides some evidence that the third
party tort is not a logical foundation for the first party tort. Recogni-
tion of the first party tort may provide a basis for extending tort reme-
dies to other kinds of contract actions.
IV. ESTABLISHING BAD FAITH
A. The Insurer's Standard of Conduct
In order to recover damages in excess of the policy limits from an
insurer in a third party action in Arkansas, the insured need only prove
that the insurer acted negligently with regard to the litigation or settle-
ment. 8 Where the insurer is under a duty to act, its failure to act
might give rise to liability based on negligence." Negligence on the
part of the insurer is not sufficient to establish the tort of first party
bad faith in Arkansas. "' In a first party action, the insured must prove
38. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Co. v. Parker, 232 Ark. 841, 341 S.W.2d 36 (1960).
39. See W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 56 (5th ed. 1984).
40. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 281 Ark. 128, 664 S.W.2d 463
1985-86]
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that the insurer affirmatively engaged in dishonest, malicious, or op-
pressive conduct. "Such a claim cannot be based upon good faith de-
nial, offers to compromise a claim or for other honest errors of judg-
ment by the insurer. Neither can this type of claim be based upon
negligence or bad judgment so long as the insurer is acting in good
faith."41
Exactly what constitutes affirmative misconduct is a question of
fact to be determined by the trier of fact. 2 A threat by the insurer to
report the payment of policy proceeds to the Internal Revenue Service
was one of the acts the insured alleged constituted bad faith in Broad-
way Arms.'3 The court held that the allegation presented a fact issue to
be determined on remand. In Williams," the jury found that the in-
surer acted in bad faith by declaring that the policy had lapsed and
could not be reinstated. 45 The insured presented proof during the trial
that the insurer had altered records to falsely show that the policy had
lapsed when in fact the insurer was holding checks that the insured had
tendered as policy premiums. In addition, the insurer had mailed the
insured a form to sign which asked the insured to acknowledge that he
had failed to pay his monthly premiums. The court found that this con-
stituted substantial evidence on which to base bad faith liability.46
The Arkansas Supreme Court has consistently emphasized that af-
firmative misconduct is required to establish first party bad faith; mere
failure to act will not give rise to the tort.'7 In Findley, where the in-
sured's cause of action in tort was based on allegations that the insurer
had failed to explain its reasons for refusing to pay claims, had failed
to investigate the diagnosis of the insured's condition and had failed to
contact the insured's physicians, the court upheld the trial court's dis-
missal of that portion of the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action. The court reasoned that inaction on the part of the insurer was
insufficient to establish the tort noting that "an action in tort cannot
ordinarily be based upon a breach of contract which amounts to mere
nonfeasance, which means not doing the thing at all, as distinguished
(1983).
41. Id. at 133, 664 S.W.2d at 465.
42. Id. at 134, 664 S.W.2d at 466.
43. Id.
44. Employers Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 282 Ark. 29, 665 S.W.2d 873 (1984).
45. Id. at 29, 665 S.W.2d at 873.
46. Id. at 33, 665 S.W.2d at 875.
47. Employers Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 282 Ark. 29, 665 S.W.2d 873 (1984);
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 281 Ark. 128, 664 S.W.2d 463 (1984);
Findley v. Time Ins. Co., 264 Ark. 647, 573 S.W.2d 908 (1978).
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from misfeasance, which means doing it improperly."' 8
B. Evidence of Insurer's Practices
The Arkansas Trade Practices Act 49 provides in pertinent part
that:
The following are hereby defined as unfair methods of competi-
tion and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the business of
insurance:
(9) UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES. Com-
mitting or performing with such frequency as to indicate a gen-
eral business practice, any of the following:
(a) Misrepresenting pertinent facts or insurance policy provi-
sions relating to coverages at issue;
(b) Failing to acknowledge and act reasonably and promptly
upon communications with respect to claims arising under insur-
ance policies;
(c) Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the
prompt investigation of claims arising under insurance policies;
(d) Refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable in-
vestigation based upon all available information;
(e) Failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reason-
able time after proof of loss statements have been completed;
(f) Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and
equitable settlements of claims in which liability has become
reasonably clear;
(g) Attempting to settle claims on the basis of an application
which was altered without notice to, or knowledge or consent of,
the insured;
(h) Making claim payments to policyholders or beneficiaries not
accompanied by a statement setting forth the coverage under
which payments are being made;
(i) Delaying the investigation or payment of claims by requiring
an insured, claimant or the physician of either to submit a pre-
liminary claim report and then requiring the subsequent submis-
sion of formal proof of loss forms, both of which submissions
contain substantially the same information;
(j) Failing to promptly provide a reasonable explanation of the
basis in the insurance policy in relation to the facts of applicable
law for denial of a claim or for the offer of a compromise
48. Findley v. Time Ins. Co., 264 Ark. 647, 653, 573 S.W.2d 908, 911 (1978).
49. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-3001 to -3014 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
1985-861
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settlement.
(k) Compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover
amounts due under an insurance policy by offering substantially
less than the amounts ultimately recovered in actions brought by
such insureds;
(1) Attempting to settle a claim for less than the amount to
which a reasonable man would have believed he was entitled by
reference to written or printed advertising material accompany-
ing or made part of an application;
(m) Making known to insureds or claimants a policy of appeal-
ing from arbitration awards in favor of insureds or claimants for
the prupose [purpose] of compelling them to accept settlements
or compromises less than the amount awarded in arbitration;
(n) Failing to promptly settle claims, where liability has become
reasonably clear, under one [1] portion of the insurance policy
coverage in order to influence settlements under other portions
of the insurance policy coverage.
In Broadway Arms the jury was instructed that violation of the
Trade Practices Act was some evidence of bad faith which should be
considered in the case.6 0 The Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that the
instruction was improper because although the statute provides that the
prohibited practices must be committed with "such frequency as to in-
dicate a general business practice,"5 1 the evidence at trial only de-
scribed the specific acts which were committed by the insurer against
Broadway Arms. The court found that the instruction improperly
stated that a violation of the Trade Practices Act was evidence of bad
faith and noted that only one section of that act related to bad faith.5 2
The extent to which evidence of violations of the Trade Practices Act
can be used at trial is not clear from the opinion in Broadway Arms.
In Williams, the court clearly approved of the introduction of evi-
dence regarding specific acts that the insurer had committed which
were violations of the Trade Practices Act and which were unrelated to
the plaintiff insured's case.53 The Arkansas Insurance Department had
50. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 281 Ark. 128, 134, 664 S.W.2d
463, 466 (1983).
51. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3005(9) (Cum. Supp. 1985). The court's statement that only sub-
section 9(f) relates by implication to bad faith is apparently a reference to the fact that only
subsection (f) contains the good faith standards. Most of the other prohibited practices which are
set out in the Act describe nonfeasance rather than misfeasance. However, subsection (a) deals
with misrepresentation and subsections (k) and (m) also deal with affirmative acts on the part of
the insurer.
52. 281 Ark. at 134, 664 S.W.2d at 466.
53. Employers Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 282 Ark. 29, 665 S.W.2d 873 (1984).
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conducted an investigation of the insurer in Williams. An investigator
for the Arkansas Insurance Department testified that as he seized some
claims files from the office of Employers Equitable a secretary tried to
destroy a note from the president of the company which read: "work
this one to death. Best regards, p.s. throw this note away now."" A
claims underwriter for the company testified that she had been in-
structed to refuse to pay claims and that she had been offered bonuses
to deny claims. There was also evidence that the company regularly
engaged in practices designed to delay payment of claims. While none
of these acts establish affirmative misconduct on the part of Employers
Equitable towards the plaintiff, the acts are evidence of malice which
may be inferred from conduct in surrounding circumstances.5 5 As a re-
sult of the investigation, the largest fine ever levied against an insurer
in Arkansas was levied against Employers Equitable."8
C. Expert Testimony
While the use of expert testimony is not absolutely necessary in a
bad faith case, it may sometimes be desirable.57 In Broadway Arms,
the plaintiff presented testimony of two attorneys regarding the prac-
tices of the insurer.5 8 The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the trial
court had not abused its discretion in refusing to admit the opinions
offered by the two attorneys on the issues of bad faith. The offer of
proof by one attorney was that the insurer had violated the Trade Prac-
tices Act and that the acts were willful, malicious or oppressive. In
discussing the appropriate role for the insured's former attorney at the
trial on remand, the court indicated that expert testimony would be
proper in a bad faith case. However, the court went on to say that an
expert witness may not testify that the insurer acted in bad faith be-
cause to do so would not only "touch upon the ultimate issue but would
in effect tell the jury how to decide the case." 59
54. Id. at 3-1, 665 S.W.2d at 874.
55. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 281 Ark. 128, 134, 664 S.W.2d
463, 465 (1983).
56. Employers Equitable ultimately was fined $50,500 and the company's license to operate
was suspended twice by the Arkansas Insurance Department. Employers Equitable Life Ins. Co. v.
Williams, 282 Ark. 29, 31, 665 S.W.2d 873, 874 (1984).
57. See J. MCCARTHY, PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN BAD FAITH CASES § 4.11 (3d ed. 1983).
58. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 281 Ark. 128, 134, 664 S.W.2d
463, 466 (1983).
59. Id. at 137, 664 S.W.2d at 467.
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V. DAMAGES IN BAD FAITH ACTIONS
Perhaps the most important aspect of bad faith is the broader
range of damages which results from the recognition of a tort. In third
party actions, the insurer has been held liable for the total amount of
any judgment against the insured, even when it was beyond the policy
limit, if the insurer was negligent or acted in bad faith in failing to
make settlement. ° Those damages compensate the insured for the in-
jury he has suffered as a result of the insurer's conduct. 1 There has
been no reported case of an award of punitive damages for third party
bad faith in Arkansas, although punitive damages could conceivably be
based on a theory of bad faith on the part of the insurer.6 2 Punitive
damages would not be allowed as a result of an insurer's negligent
conduct.6 3
The application of a tort theory of recovery to first party actions
raises the possibility of large judgments being taken against insurers
because both compensatory and punitive damages may be awarded. An
insured must prove that the insurer's conduct was dishonest, malicious,
or oppressive in order to recover compensatory damages for first party
bad faith." Punitive damages require proof of malice which can be in-
ferred from dishonest, fraudulent, or malicious conduct. 5 Therefore,
punitive damages would seem to be appropriate any time that liability
for compensatory damages for first party bad faith has been estab-
lished. The jury awarded $5,000,000 for punitive damages in Broadway
Arms and $175,000 for compensatory damages.6 In Williams, the su-
preme court affirmed a jury award of $75,000 for punitive damages
where the compensatory damages were $25,000.67 The purpose of puni-
tive damages is to punish the wrongdoer and to serve as a deterrent to
other potential wrongdoers. 68 Thus, punitive damages may be consid-
ered a penalty. Arkansas also imposes other penalties against insurers
60. See, e.g., Members Mutual Ins. Co. v. Blissett, 254 Ark. 211, 492 S.W.2d 429 (1973).
61. See H. BRILL, ARKANSAS LAW OF DAMAGES § 24-3 (1984).
62. In order to recover punitive damages, the insured would have to prove that the insurer
acted with malice. See Ray Dodge, Inc. v. Moore, 251 Ark. 1036, 479 S.W.2d 518 (1972).
63. Negligence cannot support an award of punitive damages in Arkansas. Freeman v. An-
derson, 279 Ark. 282, 651 S.W.2d 450 (1983).
64. Employers Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 282 Ark. 29, 665 S.W.2d 873 (1984);
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 281 Ark. 128, 664 S.W.2d 463 (1983).
65. See Ray Dodge, Inc. v. Moore, 251 Ark. 1036, 479 S.W.2d 518 (1972).
66. 281 Ark. 128, 131, 664 S.W.2d 463, 464 (1983).
67. 282 Ark. 29, 665 S.W.2d 873 (1984).
68. See H. BRILL, ARKANSAS LAW OF DAMAGES § 4-1 (1984); D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 3.9
(1973).
[Vol. 8:237
1985-86] FIRST PARTY BAD FAITH
by statute.
The insurance industry in Arkansas is regulated by a comprehen-
sive statutory scheme which is designed to protect individual insureds
and the public as a whole. In 1959, Arkansas adopted the Trade Prac-
tices Act,69 which prohibits unfair methods of competition in the insur-
ance industry and unfair and deceptive acts and practices. Included in
the list of prohibited acts are those acts specifically related to the set-
tlement of insurance claims.7" The insurance commissioner is author-
ized to investigate insurers to determine whether the insurers are en-
gaging in prohibited practices.7 After notice to the insurer and a
hearing,7 2 an insurer may be penalized if the commissioner determines
that the statute has been violated.7 The penalties for violation of the
Trade Practices Act include suspension or revocation of the insurer's
license, fines, and orders to cease and desist prohibited practices.7 ' All
insurers are covered by this Act. 75
Arkansas also has a penalty statute which may be used by individ-
ual insureds in lawsuits against insurers which fail to pay claims.71 In
order to recover attorneys' fees and a 12% penalty under the Arkansas
statute,7 7 an insured must prove that the insurer refused to pay a claim
69. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3001 et seq. (Supp. 1985).
70. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3005 (Supp. 1985) defines the prohibited practices. The pertinent
portions of the statute are set out in the text accompanying note 49, supra.
71. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3006 (1980).
72. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3007 (1980).
73. Id.
74. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3008 (Supp. 1985).
75. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-3003 and 66-3004 (1980).
76. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3238 (1980).
77. The statute provides that:
In all cases where loss occurs and the cargo, fire, marine, casualty, fidelity, surety,
cyclone, tornado, life, health, accident, medical, hospital, or surgical benefit insurance
company and fraternal benefits society or farmer's mutual aid association liable there-
fore shall fail to pay the same within the time specified in the policy, after demand
made therefore, such person, firm, corporation and/or association shall be liable to pay
the holder of such policy or his assigns, in addition to the amount of such loss, twelve
percent (12%) damages upon the amount of such loss, together with all reasonable at-
torney's fees for the prosecution and collection of said loss; said attorney's fees to be
taxed by the court when the same is heard on original action, by appeal or otherwise,
and to be taxed up as a part of the costs therein and collected as other costs are, or may
be by law collected; and writs of attachment or garnishment filed or issued after proof
of loss or death has been received by the company shall not defeat the provisions of this
section, provided the company or association, desiring to pay the amount of the claim as
shown in the proof of loss or death may pay said amount in to the registry of the court,
after issuance of writs of attachment and garnishment in which event there shall be no
further liability on the part of said company.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3238 (1980).
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after demand was made.7 8 The insured must then prevail at trial and
recover the exact amount prayed for in his complaint.79 Although the
courts require a strict construction of this statute because it is penal in
nature,80 an insurer is held strictly liable for its failure to pay when the
insured meets the conditions precedent to recovery under the statute. 81
Arkansas law regulating the insurance industry is similar to laws
of other jurisdictions."2 However, this similarity of statutory remedies
has been no bar to a wide variety of interpretations on the effect of
statutory remedies on the recognition of bad faith torts. At one ex-
treme, some courts have held that statutory remedies were sufficient to
provide compensation to an insured. For example, in Kansas, which has
both a statutory penalty8s and the Model Trade Practices Act, 4 the
Kansas Supreme Court held that it was undesirable for the court to
further expand an insured's remedies by judicial fiat.8 5
At the opposite extreme, some jurisdictions have held that statu-
tory regulation of the insurance industry demonstrated the legislature's
intention to provide adequate remedies to insureds and thus justified
recognition of the tort of bad faith. The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in
recognizing the tort of bad faith in a first party insurance contract, 86
justified its decision in part on the extensive statutory regulation of the
insurance industry in that state. 7
78. Federal Life & Casualty Co. v. Weyer, 239 Ark. 663, 391 S.W.2d 22 (1965).
79. Countryside Casualty Co. v. Grant, 269 Ark. 526, 601 S.W.2d 875 (1980).
80. Time Ins. Co. v. Boren, 271 Ark. 183, 607 S.W.2d 412 (1980).
81. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Wiggins, 224 Ark. 377, 273 S.W.2d 405 (1954).
82. The Uniform Trade Practices Act is model legislation which was developed by the Na-
tional Association of Insurance Commissioners. The Act was adopted as Act 148 of 1959 in
Arkansas.
83. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-256 (1981). The Kansas penalty statute provides only for attor-
neys' fees.
84. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2404 (Supp. 1984).
85. Spencer v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 227 Kan. 914, 611 P.2d 149 (1980). For a
discussion of the Spencer decision see Note, Is There an Adequate Remedy After Spencer v.
Aetna Life & Casualty Co.? 29 U. KAN. L.R. 277 (1981).
86. Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1978). The Oklahoma
Supreme Court specifically found a tort based on breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair
dealing. Punitive damages could only be awarded by characterizing the action as one in tort be-
cause Oklahoma prohibits the award of punitive damages in contract actions by statute. OKLA.
STAT. tit. 23, § 22 (1971). See Note, The New Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract: Christian v.
American Home Assurance Corp., 13 TULSA L.J. 605 (1978).
87. Oklahoma has adopted the Uniform Trade Practices Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §
1201 (West 1976), and statutory penalties which provide for attorneys' fees. OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 36, § 1 105 (West 1976) allows for an attorney's fee of not less than $100 and not more than
one-third of the judgment as a remedy against an unauthorized insurer. In accident and health
insurance claims which result in lawsuits, the prevailing party is entitled to recover attorneys' fees
and no minimum or maximum amount is set. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1219 (West 1976).
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The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals predicted in 1980 that Ar-
kansas would not recognize the tort of bad faith because of the penalty
statute. In Robinson v. MFA Mutual Ins. Co.,88 the court said:
Unlike nearly all states now recognizing the bad faith tort cause of
action, Arkansas by statute imposes penalties on insurance companies
wrongfully refusing to pay valid claims. . . . Our research indicates
that no state which has a statutorily prescribed penalty (approxi-
mately 14 states total) as Arkansas, has also permitted the bad faith
tort by judicial fiat. . . . Apparently, the view is slowly spreading
that states will have either the bad faith tort or the statutory penalty,
but not both.89
However, when the insurance company in Broadway Arms argued
that the statutory penalties available in Arkansas preempted the tort of
bad faith, the Arkansas Supreme Court responded that the tort of bad
faith was a wrong for which there was no adequate statutory remedy.
The court said:
[T]he Trade Practices Act is only an effort to clean up undesirable
conduct of insurers and the penalty and fee statute applies only to first
party claims. The penalty and fees statute is the primary remedy an
insured has against an insurer who fails or refuses to pay a claim
when there is no bad faith. The Trade Practices Act provides for pro-
cedures and penalties to be utilized by the provisions of the act.
Neither of these remedies deals with the area of bad faith much less
preempts it.9
Of the states which impose statutory penalties against an insurer
for failure to pay claims in a timely manner, almost half impose the
penalty on a strict liability basis while the remainder require proof that
the insurer is acting in bad faith. 91 Arkansas, a strict liability state,92
has ruled that the penalty statute does not preempt the bad faith tort."
The ruling is logical since the issue of bad faith never arises in the
imposition of the penalty.94 Malicious conduct and innocent error may
88. 629 F.2d 497 (8th Cir. 1980).
89. Id. at 501 n.5.
90. 281 Ark. 128, 133, 664 S.W.2d 463, 465 (1983).
91. See Holmes, A Model First-Party Insurance Excess-Liability Act, 14 GA. L. REv. 497
(1980).
92. The good faith of the insurer in contesting liability under the policy is no defense to
imposition of the penalty. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Wiggins, 224 Ark. 377, 273 S.W.2d 405
(1954).
93. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 281 Ark. 128, 664 S.W.2d 463
(1983).
94. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3238 (1980) is set out supra at note 77.
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both be the basis for the penalty. The insured need only show that he
was entitled to recover on the claim, that the claim remains unpaid
despite demand, and that he has recovered the amount for which he
sued."6 The irony lies in carrying this logic to its ultimate conclusion. If
Arkansas required proof of an insurer's bad faith in order to assess the
penalty, would the penalty then be considered preemptive of the tort
and the exclusive remedy for the wrong?
Although the insured in Broadway Arms did not recover statutory
penalties, the insured in Williams recovered statutory penalties and at-
torneys' fees in addition to compensatory and punitive damages. This
recovery led Justice Hickman, in his dissenting opinion in Williams, to
observe that "we now have in Arkansas double recovery for breach of
contract; one pursuant to statute, with appropriate penalties for failure
to pay claims, for whatever reason; and another in the majority's new
remedy for bad faith."' o
The broad array of damages which are available to an insured in a
first party action raises interesting questions about the election of
remedies.
The doctrine of election of remedies provides that if a party has two
or more inconsistent remedies on a single cause of action, only one
remedy may be ultimately pursued and only one remedy satis-
fied. . . .If a party has two or more remedies that are concurrent
and consistent, the party may pursue all of them and recover on all of
them.97
The issue of election of remedies is not addressed in Broadway Arms or
Williams. In Sturgeon v. American Family Life Assurance Co.," the
Arkansas Court of Appeals noted that the plaintiff might be required
to make an election of remedies. 9 The two remedies addressed in that
action were contract and deceit,100 which are inconsistent. 10 1 However,
in the situation where the insured is claiming that the insurer has
breached the contract of insurance by failing to pay a claim and that
the insurer's breach is in bad faith, the remedies are consistent. Thus,
in the Williams case the insured recovered for breach of the insurance
95. See, e.g., Highlands Ins. Co. v. William Burris Masonry Contractors, Inc., 258 Ark.
694, 528 S.W.2d 405 (1975).
96. 282 Ark. 29, 34, 665 S.W.2d 873, 876 (1984) (Hickman, J., dissenting).
97. H. BRILL, ARKANSAS LAW OF DAMAGES § 1-10 (1984).
98. 266 Ark. 1040, 589 S.W.2d 207 (1979).
99. Id. at 1043, 589 S.W.2d at 209.
100. For an explanation of the case, see supra note 32.
101. See Brill, The Election of Remedies Doctrine in Arkansas, 37 ARK. L. REV. 385
(1983).
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contract, statutory penalties and attorneys' fees, and in addition, recov-
ered compensatory and punitive damages for the tort.102
One of the most obvious reasons for forcing a plaintiff to choose
between remedies is to prevent a plaintiff from recovering multiple
damages for the same injury. 103 The damages for breach of contract
and compensatory damages for the tort of bad faith are easy to distin-
guish. The compensatory damages generally would be any damage that
the insured had suffered which was not compensated by the contract.
For example, in Williams the insured recovered for insurance benefits
as a result of the insurer's breach of the contract. In addition, the in-
sured recovered $25,000 for compensatory damages.'" The court found
that the insured's proof that he had suffered a second heart attack after
the insurer's breach and had suffered the anxiety of not knowing
whether he had insurance coverage was sufficient to support the award
of compensatory damages. 105
Judgments for both punitive damages and statutory penalties are
more difficult to reconcile. The purpose of punitive damages is to pun-
ish a defendant and to serve as a deterrent to other potential wrongdo-
ers.'0 In addition, punitive damages are sometimes thought to en-
courage plaintiffs to bring lawsuits as "private attorneys general" for
the good of society.0 7 The purpose of the penalty statute is to prevent
defenses by insurers for the purposes of delay and to reimburse the
insured for expenses incurred in enforcing the insurance contract.' In
addition, the courts on numerous occasions have held that the statute is
penal in nature.' 09 Although strong argument can be made that a judg-
ment for both the penalty and punitive damages, which are windfalls to
begin with, amounts to double recovery, such a recovery was permitted
in Williams.
VI. EXPANSION OF THE TORT OF BAD FAITH TO OTHER
TYPES OF CONTRACTS
The tort of bad faith has been extended by the courts from third
102. 282 Ark. 29, 665 S.W.2d 873 (1984).
103. See, e.g., Harrison v. Fulk, 128 Ark. 229, 193 S.W. 532 (1917).
104. 282 Ark. 29, 665 S.W.2d 873 (1984).
105. Id. at 33, 665 S.W.2d at 875.
106. See Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 849, 440 S.W.2d 582
(1969).
107. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 3.9 (1973).
108. Sun Life Assurance Co. v. Coker, 187 Ark. 602, 61 S.W.2d 447 (1933).
109. See, e.g., Callum v. Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co., 256 Ark. 376, 508 S.W.2d 316
(1974).
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party to first party situations despite significant differences in the na-
ture of the relationship between the insurer and the insured in first and
third party situations. In the third party situation, the insured must
agree to allow the insurer to control the claim, the litigation, and other-
wise act in the insured's behalf.110 This relationship has been character-
ized by a number of courts as fiduciary. In a fiduciary relationship, the
law imposes a duty upon the fiduciary to act in fairness and good
faith. 1 ' It is the breach of this duty which is the basis of the tort in
third party actions.
When a liability insurance company by the terms of its policy
obtains from the insured a power, irrevocable during the continuance
of its liability under the policy, to determine whether an offer of com-
promise of a claim shall be accepted or rejected, it creates a fiduciary
relationship between it and the insured with the resulting duties that
grow out of such a relationship. Under policies like those here in-
volved, the insurer and the insured owe to each other the duty to exer-
cise the utmost good faith. While the insurance company, in deter-
mining whether to accept or reject an offer of compromise, may
properly give consideration to its own interest, it must, in good faith,
give at least equal consideration to the interest of the insured and if it
fails so to do it acts in bad faith."1
If the insurer breached only those duties which it had voluntarily
assumed by the terms of the contract, the breach would only give rise
to a contract action. 1 ' It is because the breach is of a duty imposed by
law on a fiduciary that the cause of action is in tort.
The relationship between the insurer and the insured in first party
situations may or may not be analogous to a fiduciary relationship.
Even assuming that the relationship can be characterized as fiduciary
initially, the relationship is greatly altered between the insurer and the
insured when a proof of loss is filed. At that point, the insurer and the
insured become adversaries as they each attempt to resolve the claim
with the best possible results for themselves. The Broadway Arms case
provides an example of the nature of the relationship between the in-
surer and the insured. In that case, negotiations between the insured's
lawyer and the insurer's employee were the basis for one of the allega-
110. See R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW § 7.8 (3d ed. 1973).
111. Collins v. Heitman, 225 Ark. 666, 284 S.W.2d 628 (1956).
112. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v. Parker, 232 Ark. 841, 848-49, 341 S.W.2d
36, 41 (1960) (quoting American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Nichols, 173 F.2d 830, 832 (10th
Cir. 1949).
113. W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, § 92 (5th ed. 1984).
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tions of bad faith.114 As Justice Hickman noted in his concurring and
dissenting opinion, "this was a conversation between a lawyer hired by
the appellee to get the maximum benefits under the policy and an ad-
juster hired to see that no more was paid than was owed under the
policy."1 15 It is unrealistic to expect an insurer to act as a fiduciary to
an adversary.
Assuming that no fiduciary duty exists between an insurer and an
insured in a first party situation, what duty does an insurer owe to an
insured in a first party situation? The Arkansas Supreme Court found
that insurers have an obligation to pay claims to insureds in good faith.
"An insurance company may incur liability for the first party tort of
bad faith when it affirmatively engages in dishonest, malicious, or op-
pressive conduct in order to avoid a just obligation to its insured." '
If the courts recognize that the first party tort of bad faith is based
on breach of an implied in law duty of good faith,11 7 there may be
further expansion of tort liability as a result of contracts. 1 8 The first
party tort of bad faith provides an analytically sound basis for ex-
tending the tort of bad faith to some types of contracts in Arkansas.
Such an expansion is already taking place in other jurisdictions."11
In 1967, Montana announced that an insurer could be assessed
punitive damages where there was a violation of the state insurance law
even though punitive damages were not generally recoverable for
breach of contract.1 0 The breach of a duty imposed by law gave rise to
114. 281 Ark. 128, 134, 664 S.W.2d 463, 466 (1983).
115. Id. at 140, 664 S.W.2d at 469.
116. Employers Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 282 Ark. 29, 30, 665 S.W.2d 873, 873-
74 (1984) (citation omitted).
117. The duty of good faith is implied in contracts. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-1-203 (1961);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
118. See Diamond, The Tort of Bad Faith Breach: When. If At All, Should It Be Extended
Beyond Insurance Transactions?, 64 MARQ. L. REv. 425 (1981).
119. At least one jurisdiction has specifically declined to recognize a tort based on breach of
a commercial contract. In Standard Pipeline Coating Co. v. Soloman & Teslovich, Inc., 344 Pa.
Super. 367, 496 A.2d 840 (1985), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania refused to recognize such a
tort.
120. State ex rel. Larson v. District Court of Eighth Judicial Dist., 149 Mont. 131, 423 P.2d
598 (1967). The insured in Larson filed a lawsuit after the insurer stopped making credit disabil-
ity payments and the insured's car was repossessed. According to the insured, the insurer made no
attempt to determine whether the insured continued to be disabled despite the insured's request
that the insurer investigate and have the insured examined by a doctor of the insurer's choice. The
insured requested actual and punitive damages in the lawsuit alleging both breach of the insur-
ance contract and that the insurer's acts were in violation of Montana law which required immedi-
ate payment upon proof of loss. REv. CODES OF MONT. § 40-4011 (1947). The trial court granted
the insurer's motion to strike the portions of the complaint dealing with punitive damages and the
insured instituted an original proceeding seeking a writ of supervisory control to determine his
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the punitive damages.121 In 1983, the Montana Supreme Court, finding
that a covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in employment
contracts, reversed a summary judgment which had been entered- in
favor of the employer in Gates v. Life of Montana Insurance Co. 2'
After a trial of the case resulted in a jury verdict for the employee for
$1,891 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages, the
trial court affirmed the award of compensatory damages but entered
judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the defendant on pu-
nitive damages.12 3 The Montana Supreme Court upheld the award of
compensatory damages and ordered the trial court to reinstate the
award of punitive damages, finding that:
An action for breach of an implied covenant of fair dealing, at
first blush, may sound both in contract and tort. The duty arises out
of the employment relationship yet the duty exists apart from, and in
addition to, any terms agreed to by the parties. In this respect, the
duty is much like the duty to act in good faith in discharging insur-
ance contractual obligations. The duty is imposed by operation of law
and therefore its breach should find a remedy in tort. . . . Breach of
the duty owed to deal fairly and in good faith in the employment rela-
tionship is a tort for which punitive damages can be recovered if de-
fendant's conduct is sufficiently culpable.1 '
In Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconess Hospital,1 5 the Montana Su-
preme Court held that the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing in employment contracts also extends to probationary employees.
In 1984, the Montana Supreme Court announced that punitive
damages could be recovered where there was a breach of a statutory
obligation of good faith and the conduct was sufficiently culpable in
First National Bank v. Twombly. 12 ' Twombly and his wife had bor-
rowed $3,500 on a promissory note which was accompanied by a secur-
ity agreement granting the bank a security interest in an ice machine,
inventory, and accounts receivable. Shortly before the lump sum pay-
right to exemplary damages in the lawsuit. The Montana Supreme Court reconciled Westfall v.
Motors Ins. Corp., 140 Mont. 564, 374 P.2d 96 (1962) in holding that punitive damages were
recoverable in the action. The court said that a unique situation was presented by the insurance
contract case because "some acts may be both breaches of contract and violations of the laws of
Montana." 149 Mont. 131, 133, 423 P.2d 598, 600 (1983).
121. 149 Mont. at 135, 423 P.2d at 600.
122. 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063 (1982).
123. Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 40 Mont. 1287, 668 P.2d 213 (1983).
124. Id. at 1288, 668 P.2d at 214 (citations omitted).
125. 693 P.2d 487 (Mont. 1984).
126. 689 P.2d 1226 (Mont. 1984).
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ment of principal and interest were due on the note, the Twomblys'
attempt to purchase the restaurant they were running on a lease/
purchase agreement failed. They contacted an employee of the bank
and worked out an agreement to reduce the principal amount of the
note and bring the interest current by the due date. The remainder of
the loan would be converted to an installment loan. Two weeks before
the due date, Twombly contacted another employee of the bank to dis-
cuss converting the loan. Upon being told that the loan would not be
converted, Twombly became upset and said that he would not be able
to pay the entire loan in two weeks. After the phone conversation and
based on Twombly's statement, the bank determined that the note was
in jeopardy and offset Twombly's checking account in the amount of
$2,865.127 The bank sued for the remainder of the promissory note and
Twombly counterclaimed, alleging breach of the duty of good faith.
The jury awarded Twombly $4,000 in compensatory damages but the
trial court refused to instruct the jury on punitive damages.1 28
The court noted that the Uniform Commercial Code, which ap-
plies to the type of transaction at issue in Twombly, imposes an obliga-
tion of good faith on every contract and duty within the Code. 29 In
addition, the Uniform Commercial Code provides that where a contract
allows a party to accelerate payment or performance "at will" or
"when he deems himself insecure," the provision "shall be construed to
mean that he shall have power to do so only if he in good faith believes
that the prospect of payment or performance is impaired."'' 0 After not-
ing that the obligation to act in good faith is imposed by law, the court
said: "When the duty to exercise good faith is imposed by law rather
than the contract itself, as in Gates v. Life of Montana Insurance Com-
pany . . . the breach of that duty is tortious. Therefore, punitive dam-
ages are recoverable if the Bank's conduct is sufficiently culpable." 31
The case was remanded for a new trial on the issue of punitive
damages. 32
127. 689 P.2d at 1228-29.
128. The trial court's judgment offset the balance due on the note, the interest accrued and
attorney's fees in favor of the bank. Therefore, judgment was entered for the Twomblys in the
amount of $1,392.49. 689 P.2d at 1227-28.
129. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-1-203 (1985), which provides: "Obligation of Good Faith.
Every contract or duty within this code imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or
enforcement."
130. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-1-208 (1985).
131. First Nat'l Bank v. Twombly, 689 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Mont. 1984) (citations omitted).
132. 689 P.2d at 1231.
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In Morse v. Espeland,33 an attorney sued a former client for at-
torneys' fees. The attorney won a motion for summary judgment on the
client's counterclaim, which alleged a breach of fiduciary duty, con-
structive fraud, actual fraud, deceit and legal malpractice. On appeal
from the award of summary judgment, the Montana Supreme Court
found that the complaint stated facts sufficient to support a claim for
bad faith on the part of the attorney. The court said:
[A]s an attorney, respondent owed his client the obligation to
deal fairly and in good faith when negotiating a fee and when ulti-
mately charging and collecting the fee. The inequality that exists be-
tween attorney and client in bargaining over a fee is apparent. The
attorney knows his or her legal rights. The client probably does not.
In negotiating and collecting the fee, the attorney is represented. The
client is not. In negotiating and collecting the fee, the attorney is in a
vastly superior position to the client and the rationale of Gates and
Dare, supra, mandates the application of the covenant to this relation-
ship. If the facts alleged by the appellant are true, the fact-finder
could determine there was a breach of the obligation owed to deal
fairly and in good faith.18'
The appellate courts of California have been faced with the pros-
pect of extending the tort of bad faith breach of contract to commercial
contracts other than insurance on a number of occasions. 35 Although
the courts on several occasions declined to extend liability, 36 or simply
avoided the issue,1 87 the court in Cleary v. American Airlines38 held
that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action for the tort of bad faith
breach of contract. The plaintiff, who was an employee of American
Airlines, claimed that he had been fired for participating in union ac-
tivities. The trial court found that the plaintiff had not stated a cause
133. 696 P.2d 428 (Mont. 1985). The client alleged that the attorney had given her the
impression at their initial meeting that he would charge $5,000 for a dissolution unless the dissolu-
tion became particularly complicated, in which case the fee might be higher. During the course of
the proceedings the client received and rejected a settlement offer between $100,000 and
$125,000. The client's final judgment consisted of property valued at $667,555.75. The attorney
then informed the client that the dissolution was going to cost her a lot of money and asked her to
agree to a 10% fee. The client refused to pay the attorney and a lawsuit resulted.
134. 696 P.2d at 430-31.
135. See Louderback & Jurika, Standards for Limiting the Tort of Bad Faith Breach of
Contract, 16 U.S.F.L. REV. 187 (1981) for a discussion of the development of law in California.
136. Wagner v. Benson, 101 Cal. App. 3d 27, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1980); Sawyer v. Bank of
America, 83 Cal. App. 3d 135, 145 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1978).
137. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield, 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839
(1980).
138. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
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of action for wrongful discharge, but the court of appeals reversed,
stating that "[tiermination of employment without legal cause after
such a period of time' 89 offends the implied-in-law covenant of good
faith and fair dealings contained in all contracts, including employment
contracts.
1 40
The extension of the tort of bad faith breach to employment rela-
tionships was again recognized by the California Court of Appeals in
Rulon-Miller v. International Business Machines Corp."' The plain-
tiff's employment with IBM was terminated because of her personal
relationship with an employee of an IBM competitor. The employer
claimed that the plaintiff's relationship created a conflict of interest.
The court determined that not only was there no conflict of interest but
that IBM had established a policy of no company interest in the
outside activities of an employee so long as the activities did not inter-
fere with the work of the employee. The court of appeals affirmed the
finding of breach of the duty to act towards the employee in good
faith.14 2
In 1984, the California Supreme Court heard Seaman's Direct
Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co."3 Seaman's negotiated with
Standard to obtain an oil supply contract in order to lease space in a
marina to operate a marine fuel distributorship. Standard sent a letter
to Seaman's confirming the agreement and Seaman's used the letter as
evidence of an oil supply contract in order to obtain the lease from the
city. A year later Standard informed Seaman's that it could not meet
the terms of the letter, apparently due to the effect of the Arab oil
embargo. Seaman's instigated an appeal with the Federal Energy Of-
fice and was told that a supply order would be issued if Seaman's could
establish that a valid supply contract existed between Seaman's and
Standard. Standard was aware that Seaman's could not afford to fi-
nance a trial to prove the existence of the contract but refused to ac-
knowledge the existence of the contract. Seaman's went out of business
and sued Standard for intentional interference with contractual rela-
tionships, breach of contract, and breach of the implied covenant of
139. The plaintiff had been employed by American Airlines for 18 years. Id. at 450, 168 Cal.
Rptr. at 729.
140. Id.
141. 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984).
142. In affirming the decision, the court of appeals stated "[it is not so much the duty owed
under the contract as the duty arising from the relationship of one party to another . . . .That
duty, at least, is implied from the formulation of the tort, namely, to act without bad faith and
with probable cause." Id. at 249, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 533.
143. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
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good faith and fair dealing.1 4 The California Supreme Court was thus
faced squarely with the issue of whether to extend tort liability for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith to a commercial contract.
The court, however, found that it was not necessary to determine
whether Standard incurred liability as a result of breach of the implied
covenant of good faith. The court held that "[i]t is sufficient to recog-
nize that a party to a contract may incur tort liability when, in addition
to breaching the contract, it seeks to shield itself from liability by deny-
ing, in bad faith and without probable cause, that the contract ex-
ists."' Although the tort which was recognized by the court in Sea-
man's is more limited than a simple recognition of the existence of a
tort of bad faith breach in commercial contracts, it definitely broadens
the application of tort remedies to commercial contract settings outside
the area of insurance. 46
The California Supreme Court in Seaman's discussed its reluc-
tance to extend the tort of bad faith breach.
In holding that a tort action is available for breach of the cove-
nant in an insurance contract, we have emphasized the 'special rela-
tionship' between insurer and insured, characterized by elements of
public interest, adhesion, and fiduciary responsibility. No doubt there
are other relationships with similar characteristics and deserving of
similar legal treatment.
When we move from such special relationships to consideration
of the tort remedy in the context of the ordinary commercial contract,
we move into largely uncharted and potentially dangerous waters. 147
In Wilson v. Donze,148 the Texas Court of Appeals affirmed an
award of compensatory and punitive damages against a real estate bro-
ker.149 The broker purchased the plaintiffs' property as trustee and re-
sold it the same day for a profit of almost $30,000. The court held that
the broker's "willful and malicious breach of his fiduciary duty . . .
was of such a tortious nature as to permit the recovery of exemplary
damages."1 0
144. Id. at 762, 686 P.2d at 1162, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
145. Id. at 769, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
146. See Comment, Sailing the Uncharted Seas of Bad Faith: Seaman's Direct Buying Ser-
vice, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 69 MINN. L. REv. 1161 (1985).
147. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 1166-67, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 362-63 (1984) (citation
omitted).
148. 692 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. App. 1985).
149. The jury awarded $24,900 in actual damages and $35,000 in exemplary damages. Id. at
736.
150. Id. at 740.
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The Arkansas Supreme Court seemed willing to extend the tort of
bad faith to surety relationships in Johnson v. Safeco Insurance Co.'5'
The plaintiffs made an offer to purchase a house and paid $400 as ear-
nest money. Although the offer was not accepted, the real estate broker
and salesman refunded only $100 of the earnest money. Safeco Insur-
ance Company was the surety on the broker's statutory bond.'52 The
Johnsons filed suit against Safeco alleging that Safeco failed, in bad
faith, to investigate their claim and failed to pay the $300. The court
found that the plaintiffs' complaint was demurrable because there was
no allegation of affirmative wrongdoing on the part of the surety. 53
However, the court did not go so far as to say that no such cause of
action was recognized under Arkansas law.
The Arkansas Supreme Court, however, has clearly indicated that
Arkansas does not recognize "tortious breach of contract," at least
outside the insurance area. In L.L. Cole and Son, Inc. v. Hickman,"'
an opinion which was delivered the same day as Williams, the court
reversed a judgment for punitive damages because it appeared to be
based on a breach of contract. Mr. Hickman had leased farmland from
L.L. Cole and Son, Inc., for the purpose of raising crops. Mr. Hickman
sought punitive damages as a result of "tortious breach of contract"
alleging that an agent of L.L. Cole and Son, Inc., had intentionally
breached the contract by interfering with his attempts to raise crops.
He also alleged that the agent had called him between midnight and
two a.m. to curse and abuse him, and the agent had pursued a course
of conduct designed to "harass, ridicule, and embarrass the plain-
151. 265 Ark. 9, 576 S.W.2d 220 (1979).
152. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 71-1305 (Supp. 1977), which requires real estate brokers to post
a $2,000 bond.
153. The court compared Safeco's position to that of an insurer in a first party situation and
found that:
Safeco's position is even stronger than that of the insurance company in Findley, for
Safeco was merely a surety upon the broker's bond, not an insurance company issuing a
policy directly to the plaintiffs and receiving its premiums from them. If a surety should
pay a claim when there is no liability on the part of its principal, it is treated as a
volunteer and cannot recover the payment from the principal. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.
v. Clark, 253 Ark. 1025, 490 S.W.2d 447 (1973). Another possible defense, in addition
to any that might be raised by the principal, could be that the $2,000 maximum liabil-
ity under the bond had been discharged in the payment of other claims or had to be
prorated among various claimants. Thus the mere allegation that the broker and the
salesman failed to return the plaintiffs' earnest money does not necessarily state a cause
of action against the surety.
265 Ark. 10, 11, 576 S.W.2d 220, 221-22.
154. 282 Ark. 6, 665 S.W.2d 278 (1984).
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tiff.'" 5 There was proof at trial that the agent had intentionally inter-
fered with Mr. Hickman's farm work, had removed the key to a relift
pump causing damage to the crops for lack of water, and had ordered
Mr. Hickman from one of the fields that had been leased. The jury
returned a verdict for $42,270 in compensatory damages and $275,000
in punitive damages.
After acknowledging that the law in regard to the relation between
causes of action in contract and tort is confused and still in the process
of developing, the court determined that the cause of action in this case
was actually one in contract. The court went on to find that although
there were cases in Arkansas which seem to allow punitive damages in
contract actions, all of these cases were actually situations in which the
punitive damages were based on independent tortious acts. The court
then held that, prospectively, punitive damages would not be available
in contract actions.15 6 In addition, the cause of action in tort must be
specifically plead and proved.
The opinion indicates that where an action in either contract or
tort is possible, the plaintiff will have to elect between the two
remedies.
Ordinarily, where on the facts either an action in contract or one
in tort is possible, the plaintiff must make a choice. A plaintiff should
either plead and prove his cause of action in contract or in tort. Since
the purpose of the law of contracts is to see that promises are per-
formed while the law of torts provides redress for various injuries, and
since punitive damages are ordinarily not awarded in contract but
may be awarded in tort, the distinction is an important one. Where on
the facts the action may sound either in contract or tort or both, the
court itself will often seek to determine the real character of the
action. 5 7
This decision is extremely difficult to reconcile with the Williams
opinion, which was handed down the same day. In Williams, the court
affirmed judgments for damages for breach of contract and for tortious
conduct arising out of the same incident. 5" The distinguishing feature
in the two causes of action is that one is for breach of an insurance
contract while the other is for breach of a lease of real property. In
neither case does a fiduciary relationship exist between the plaintiff and
the defendant. In both cases, a valid argument can be made that the
155. Id. at 7, 665 S.W.2d at 280.
156. Id. at 10, 665 S.W.2d at 281.
157. Id. at 9, 665 S.W.2d at 281 (citation omitted).
158. 282 Ark. 29, 665 S.W.2d 873 (1984).
[Vol. 8:237
FIRST PARTY BAD FAITH
law imposes an obligation on the parties to deal with each other in good
faith. At some point, the Arkansas Supreme Court will have to recog-
nize the similarities between bad faith breach of insurance contracts
and bad faith breach of other types of contracts and either reconcile or
distinguish the two.
VII. CONCLUSION
Insurers have long been subjected to extensive statutory regulation
and high standards of care because of the nature of their business. Per-
sons who purchase insurance are purchasing the security of knowing
that in the event of a tragedy or disaster they will at least be cared for
financially. The recognition of first party bad faith in Arkansas can be
viewed quite simply as completing the remedies which should be availa-
ble to an insured. With the third party bad faith tort, Arkansas pro-
vided a remedy for compensating insureds who suffered excessive judg-
ments because of their insurers' mishandling of litigation. Statutory
penalties have provided compensation to insureds who suffered delay in
payment of insurance proceeds regardless of the reason for delay. First
party bad faith now provides compensation for insureds who suffer
damages as a result of their insurers' willful and malicious misconduct.
The recognition of the tort of bad faith in first party insurance
relationships may mark the first step towards recognition of bad faith
torts in other types of contractual relationships. Although the Arkansas
Supreme Court did not willingly embrace a tort remedy as well as a
contract remedy in L.L. Cole and Sons, the court did not rule out such
a cause of action. The court merely held that a plaintiff would have to
choose between the tort and contract remedies, not that the tort rem-
edy was unavailable. There is a distinct possibility that the tort of bad
faith breach could be applied in contracts other than insurance in fu-
ture Arkansas cases.
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